We investigate whether restricting elected leadership positions to candidates with "desirable" characteristics leads to the society-wide adoption of those characteristics in a democracy with high political participation. Exploiting quasi-experimental variation in fertility limits imposed on village council members in India to curb population growth, we find that rural couples significantly decreased fertility in response, and child survival improved. However, the limits also increased the already male-biased sex ratio at birth in castes with strong son preference.
I. Introduction
Developing countries often employ policy measures to lower fertility, such as direct fertility limits on citizens (for example, China's One Child Policy), conditional cash transfers (for example, the Devi Rupak program in the Indian state of Haryana), and incentives to promote contraceptive use (for example, sterilization incentives in India). We examine a novel policy experiment that, in an attempt to decrease fertility, sets limits on the number of children that candidates for local political offices can have. Specifically, we analyze the impact of state-level legislations in India that disbar individuals with more than two children from contesting village council (Panchayat) elections on fertility-related outcomes in the general population.
The rural local government system in India comprises village-, block-, and districtlevel councils that exercise considerable power. Starting in 1992, 11 states enacted fertility limits for at least some years, and they remain in effect in seven major states. In all states, these laws provided a one-year grace period from the time of announcement, during which an individual could have additional children and still remain eligible for election. However, for people with two or more children by the end of the grace period, a subsequent birth leads to disqualification. Individuals with fewer than two children by the end of the grace period are limited to at most two children afterwards to maintain eligibility. We exploit geographical and temporal variation in announcement of these fertility limits across states to estimate their impacts on citizens' demographic outcomes.
This manipulation of the candidate pool aims to curb population growth and was not intended to improve leaders' performance directly.
1 Instead, the laws seek to improve economic outcomes by precipitating fertility decline. The fertility limits, however, potentially impose costs as they incentivize couples to deviate from their preferred fertility path and shrink the candidate pool. To the extent that individuals from certain socioeconomic strata have higher desired fertility and lower contraceptive access, the limits may increase inequality in political representation. An understanding of the tradeoff between the intended effect on citizens' fertility behaviors and the unintended effect of disenfranchising certain socioeconomic groups is therefore crucial in determining the overall effectiveness of the laws.
We find that among couples who had two children when the law was announced in their state, the hazard of third birth declined by 1.97 percentage points, which is 9 percent of the baseline hazard of third birth. These magnitudes are comparable to the effects of well-known fertility control programs, such as the Matlab intervention in Bangladesh, which reduced child-to-mother ratios by 16 percent, and the combined Navrongo interventions in Ghana, which reduced children ever born to treated women by 9 percent (Canning and Schultz 2012) . There were no significant effects on the marginal fertility of couples who had three or more children at the time the laws were announced, as these families had likely already achieved their desired family size. 2 We also examine the impact of the limits on the "stock" of fertility and find that in enacting states the probability of having a total of three or more children in any given year declined by 1.33 percentage points or 4.42 percent, and the probability of having only two children increased by 0.75 percentage points or 3.41 percent. The fertility decline appears permanent-our event study analysis shows sustained decreases even six to nine years after the limits were announced.
We find improvements in survival rates of children due to the limits. However, the fertility restrictions also adversely affected the already male-biased sex ratio among social groups with high son preference, thus increasing the number of missing girls. The human capital and income gains from fertility decline are therefore undermined by worsening gender inequality. Our estimates suggest that 1,230,780 individuals, or 1.33 percent of married rural couples of childbearing age in treatment states, responded to the fertility limits by restricting their fertility to two or fewer children.
There are at least three different channels that may underlie any effect of the two-child limits on state-wide fertility. If elected representatives serve as role models, their constituents may be indirectly affected by these limits as they emulate their leaders' fertility choices ("role model channel"). This appears to be the primary mechanism the policymakers had in mind when these laws were enacted.
3 Societal fertility decline may also be driven by citizens' desire to maintain eligibility for future village council candidacy ("aspirations or incentives channel"). Additionally, even if citizens do not have political ambitions, they may adjust fertility if the limits signal that similarly restrictive policies may be enacted for government jobs, for instance ("anticipation channel"). While we cannot credibly separate these channels as potential explanations for our results, at the minimum we show that policy interventions in the political sphere can have substantial impacts in a highly participatory democratic society.
The fertility limits potentially have crucial implications for the welfare of the socially disadvantaged, who, relative to high socioeconomic status groups, have higher fertility, face greater risk of child mortality, and depend more on political representation to obtain resources prone to elite capture. On the other hand, higher baseline fertility makes low socioeconomic status families more "treatable" by the limits. We find that the decline in third births is concentrated in families with low wealth, with no schooling, and in lower castes that rely on mandated reservations for political representation. Moreover, the increase in the probability of having two children, while not as precisely estimated, does not differ by socioeconomic status. These findings reduce concerns about greater elite capture of public resources due to the limits.
Our paper makes novel contributions to the literature on family planning interventions, which can promote economic growth, human capital accumulation, and women's empowerment when effective (Rosenzweig and Zhang 2009; Miller 2010; Ashraf, Weil, and Wilde 2013; Joshi and Schultz 2013) . We also contribute to the literature on determinants of sex ratios. Recent papers have highlighted the effect of fertility decline on rising sex ratios in societies like India where sons are preferred (Ebenstein 2010; Anukriti 2018; Jayachandran 2017) . We augment this literature by analyzing a new source of fertility decline and show that it too has an unintended effect on sex ratios.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the legislations. Sections III and IV describe the data and the empirical strategy, respectively. Section V presents the results; Section VI describes some robustness checks; and Section VII discusses the magnitudes of our estimates. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. Background
India is the world's second most populous country and houses a third of its poorest citizens (Olinto et al. 2013) . Consequently, population control remains a policy priority. On the basis of recommendations of the 1992 Committee on Population, several Indian states have enacted fertility limits for village council candidates, 4 seeking to lower fertility through the role-model channel. 5 Additionally, the fertility limits also incentivize individuals who intend to contest elections to plan smaller families.
A. India's Local Political System
India has a three-tiered system of local governance in rural areas, known as the Panchayati Raj (PR). It comprises village-level councils (Gram Panchayat), block-level councils (Panchayat Samiti), and district-level councils (Zila Parishad). Regular village council elections take place every five years in most states. The village councils exercise considerable power in their constituencies, receiving substantial funds from national and state governments and implementing development schemes.
6 Village councils are also responsible for providing public goods, such as village roads, wells, and waterworks. They can collect taxes and license fees and receive seignorage from the auction of local mineral and forestry resources.
The typical monthly salary of a village council head is about USD 50-60, and other council members are paid less. While these official wages are not large, the potential private returns from political rents and corrupt practices may provide a strong incentive to run for office. According to the Association for Democratic Reforms, an average candidate spends USD 400-800 during a village council election.
7 However, the benefits from even one term as a council member are likely to be much higher. The average declared wealth of recontesting candidates to the Parliament and state legislative assemblies in 2004 was 134 percent higher than their wealth during the first election (Sastry 2014) , suggesting high rents. Fisman et al. (2014) also show that the annual asset growth of winners in state elections is three to five percentage points higher than that of runners-up. Although similar statistics are not available for village council candidates, the returns from council membership are likely to also be large.
The average population per village council is about 3,100, although the size varies widely. The minimum age to contest elections is 21 years. There are no term limits on village council members. In Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, respectively, 19 percent and 33 percent of council chiefs were under 36 years old, and 56 percent and 51 percent were in the 36-50 year age group. The council members are typically younger: 47 percent of village council members in 2012 in Rajasthan were under 36 years of age, and 41 percent were in the 36-50 year age group. The age composition of council members suggests that the fertility limits could impact a large share of potential candidates of childbearing age.
4. In fact, the Committee recommended these restrictions for all elected positions-from village councils to the national Parliament. 5. According to Buch (2005) , the introduction of these laws "and the widespread fascination for [it] draw inspiration from China's one child policy." Although, the legal documents pertaining to these laws do not explicitly spell out their ultimate objectives, these legislations are in tune with India's national population policy that seeks to, in the long-run, "achieve a stable population.at a level consistent with the requirements of sustainable economic growth, social development, and environmental protection." This suggests that policymakers perceive fertility reduction as a way to decrease poverty and to improve social indicators such as health and education. 6. Village councils are often authorized to identify local beneficiaries of major central and state development schemes, such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. 7. Source: http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/the-rs-81-500-crore-lie-565175 (accessed May 21, 2018).
The PR Act requires that at least one-third of all member and chief positions are reserved for women.
8 Similarly, positions are reserved for Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) in proportion to their population share.
9 As lower castes have higher fertility and lower contraceptive access, the limits may increase caste inequality in political representation and thus may reverse affirmative action gains. To examine these heterogeneous impacts, we also present results separately for minority groups.
Voter turnout in village elections routinely exceeds 70 percent. In the 2014 World Values Survey, 53 percent of the respondents (69 percent among the "lower class") say that politics is "very important" or "rather important" in their life and about 48 percent of the respondents are members of a political party. Thus, our results have significant implications for the understanding of the relationship between political participation and social change in low-income democracies.
B. The Fertility Limits
Eleven states have imposed fertility limits on village council members for at least a few years, and they remain in effect in seven states. Rajasthan was the first state to introduce the two-child limit for its village councils in 1992; 10 this requirement was later included in the state's 1994 PR Act.
11 Andhra Pradesh and Haryana announced their legislations in 1994, 12 although the latter revoked its law in 2006. Orissa announced the limit for its district councils in 1993 and for the village and block councils in 1994. Himachal Pradesh (HP), Madhya Pradesh (MP), and Chhattisgarh 13 introduced their laws in 2000 and repealed them in 2005. In Maharashtra, the law has been in retrospective effect since 2002. Lastly, Bihar and Uttarakhand adopted the limit in 2002 and 2007, respectively, but only for municipal elections. Table 1 presents a more detailed timeline for the announcement, the grace period, and the implementation of these laws.
14 The relevant clauses from each state's PR Act are available in the Online Appendix.
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Village council candidates do not have to explicitly state their number of children when filing the nomination papers. However, they have to declare that, to the best of their knowledge, they are qualified for the council seat.
These laws potentially disproportionately affect candidates who are Muslim, who belong to a scheduled caste or tribe, and who are relatively poor. Appendix Table A .1 displays the fraction of women in a socioeconomic group who report that their ideal number of children is more than two. As compared to 48 percent of upper caste women, 56 percent of SC-ST women ideally desire more than two children. Among Muslims, 8 . In 14 states, one-half of all seats are reserved for women. 9. Quotas are implemented in a stratified manner-among positions reserved for SC, ST, and "general" castes, one-third are randomly chosen for women. 10. Rajasthan's law predates the recommendations of the Committee on Population. 11. The 1994 Act included a grace period from April 23, 1994 to November 27, 1995. Effectively, this resulted in a nearly three-year grace period since the original announcement was made in 1992. 12. However, since the 1994 elections in Haryana took place before the announcement and since members are elected for a period of five years, no one was disqualified during 1995-2000. 13. Chhattisgarh inherited the law when it was carved out of MP in 2000. Since 2004, candidates below 30 years of age in Chhattisgarh are also required to be literate. 14. This information is largely based on Buch (2005 Buch ( , 2006 . 15. The Online Appendix can be found at http://jhr.uwpress.org/. 65 percent women and their husbands would be disqualified if they had the woman's desired number of children relative to 49 percent of Hindus. Similarly, the limits would disbar 59 percent of the couples in the bottom third of the wealth distribution, and only 23 percent of those in the top third of the wealth distribution.
Appendix Table A .2 shows the number of village council members that were disqualified under these laws in Haryana, Rajasthan, MP, and AP during 2000-2004. 16 Newspaper reports suggest that, in some cases, the fertility limits have led to the abandonment of wives or children or selective abortion of female fetuses to avoid disqualification. Consequently, implementing states have faced criticism from women's rights advocates and civil society organizations, as well as from the central government. 17 The revocation of the limits in four states may have been in response to this pressure.
III. Data
We utilize three cross-sectional rounds of the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-1, -2, -3) of India that were conducted in 1992-1993, 1998-1999, and 2005-2006 . Each round is representative at the state level and includes a complete retrospective birth history for the woman interviewed, containing information on the month and the year of birth, birth order, and mother's age at birth. We combine these birth histories to construct an unbalanced woman-year panel; a woman enters the panel in her year of first marriage and exits in her year of survey.
For consistency across rounds, we limit the sample to women in the 15-49 age group who were married at the time of the survey. We also drop women (i) whose marriage took place more than 20 years before the survey to avoid issues related to imperfect recall, (ii) whose husband were younger than 15 or older than 80 in the year of survey, and (iii) who had more than ten children, to prevent any composition-bias since these women are likely different from rest of the sample. Lastly, we exclude mothers with twins since multiple births in our context are largely unplanned and do not reflect fertility preferences. However, our results are robust to the inclusion of these observations. We restrict our analysis to the rural subsample as almost all the fertility limits in our sample period, with the exception of Uttarakhand, were enacted for rural councils.
18 Our final sample comprises 99,804 women and 256,267 births from 18 major states 19 and covers the time period 1973-2006. We define treatment based on the year of the announcement of the law, that is, the earliest year when the law might have had an effect in a state. 20 The sample means for the three groups in Table 2 are similar along many socioeconomic dimensions, but there are several significant differences, as the enactment of the limits was not randomized across states. To ensure that our estimates are not confounded by underlying differences, we control for religion, caste, standard of living, and husband's and wife's years of schooling in all regressions. To take into account state-specific factors, we include state fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends. Crucially, we also show in the next section that the timing of policy announcements across states is uncorrelated with changes in these socioeconomic characteristics across states and over time.
IV. Empirical Strategy
We aim to estimate the causal effect of the two-child limits on candidates in village council elections in a state on fertility-related outcomes among citizens. To do so, we utilize geographical and temporal variation in announcement of these laws across Indian states. Although 11 states have enacted such a law thus far, due to data limitations we can estimate the impact for only seven (eight) states: Rajasthan, Haryana, AP, Orissa, HP, MP (including Chhattisgarh), and Maharashtra. This is because the limits came into effect in Bihar and Gujarat after 2006, which is the most recent year in our data set, so we include these states in the control group. Gujarat announced its law in 2005, so we can potentially include it in the treatment group and use 2006 as the posttreatment year; doing so makes no difference to our results. Uttarakhand announced its law for urban municipal elections in 2002, but we exclude it from the treatment group because Uttarakhand was a part of Uttar Pradesh until 2000, and we cannot distinguish between the two in the pre-2000 sample. 21 In addition to Bihar, Gujarat, and Uttarakhand, our control group comprises nine other states. Figure 1 depicts the treatment and control states in a map.
We begin by examining how the hazard of birth evolved before and after the laws were announced in the treatment states, in an event-study framework. Specifically, for a woman i of age a in state s and year t, we estimate the following model:
We include only treatment states in Specification 1 since there is no unique reference year that can be used to split the sample period into pre-and post-years for the control states; this is because the announcement year varies across the treated states. Treat s,t+k indicates k years during which the law is in place; we assign the year before the year of announcement as the omitted year. The outcome variables Y iast are indicators for first, 20. Low and High SLI are equal to one if the household belongs to the bottom third or the top third of household wealth distribution in all of India (that is, rural as well as urban areas). 21. Note that UP has never enacted a two-child limit for its local politicians.
second, third, fourth, and fifth birth. We control for fixed effects for state, year, and woman's age (g s , y t , and c a, respectively), state-specific linear trends (n s * t), and the following covariates (X i ): five categories each for a woman's and her husband's years of schooling, indicators for religion (five categories), caste (four categories), and SLI (three categories) of the household, and for the year of interview. The a k coefficients capture the evolution of the hazard of birth in treatment states before and after the announcement of the fertility limits over a 20-year period. Note that for the hazards of fourth and fifth birth k lies in the interval [-9, 6 ] as there are not enough observations to estimate Specification 1 over the full period.
Figure 1 Treatment and Control States
Notes: Treatment states (in dark gray) are those that have enacted a fertility limit at some point during our sample period. Control or never-treated states (in light gray) are those that have not.
To measure the net effect of the limits on the hazard of an additional birth, we estimate:
In Specification 2 we include both treatment and control states: Treat st is equal to one for women residing in the treated states if t is greater than or equal to the year of announcement, and zero otherwise; for control states, Treat st is always zero. In addition to the variables included in Specification 1, we also control for state · mother's age fixed effects (m sa ) and fixed effects for years since last birth or, in case of the hazard of first birth, years since marriage in Specification 2. Where the outcome indicates a birth of order b, we restrict the sample to women whose previous (b -1) births took place before the law was announced in their respective states.
22 These regressions, therefore, capture the effects of the fertility limits on marginal fertility of affected households. Note that, unlike Specification 1, Specification 2 uses all available pre-and postannouncement years for each state in our sample that satisfy the previously mentioned restrictions. Also, we restrict the sample to up to ten years after birth (b -1), as after this the probability of another birth of order b converges to zero in both treatment and control states.
While Specification 2 tells us how marginal fertility was affected for couples who already had a certain number of children when the limits were announced in their state, it does not measure the overall impact of the laws on the "stock" of fertility. Therefore, we reestimate Equation 2 using indicators for whether a woman i of age a in state s and year t reports having one, two, three, four, and five living children in year t as the outcome variables. Unlike the hazard analysis, however, in this case we do not impose any restrictions on when prior children were born, and use all available years for each woman. If the two-child limits are effective, we expect the likelihood of having two children to increase in the treatment states after the laws were announced.
The two-child laws may also affect the sex ratio at birth. For example, parents who do not have the desired number of sons when the law is announced and who can have an additional birth without violating the limit may be more likely to practice sex selection. Therefore, we estimate the impact of the fertility limits on the sex ratio of second and higher parity births for couples whose first child was born before the limits were announced in their state. Specifically, we estimate the following specification where the outcome variable is an indicator for the child being male:
This specification is similar to Specification 2 except that we also control for the sex of the first child, Girl i . We focus on second and higher parity births because the prior literature has shown that, despite the availability of prenatal sex-determination technology, sex of the first birth is plausibly random in India (Das Gupta and Bhat 1997; Visaria 2005; Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010) , and most instances of sex selection occur for higher order births. This finding is consistent with recent survey data that suggest 22. Note that in the event-study regressions for the hazard of birth b we do not impose any constraints on the year of birth (b -1), which may also have been affected by the fertility limits. Later, we check if the results are similar when no restrictions are imposed on the timing of prior births while estimating Specification 1.
that Indian parents do not always prefer having a son over a daughter-Jayachandran (2017) finds that although the vast majority of families want to have a son if they can only have one child, at a family size of two they prefer having one daughter and one son over having two sons. In fact, Table 2 shows that the sex ratio at first birth in our sample is "normal" (that is, is between 0.516 and 0.519) in the never-treated states and in the treatment states (both pre-and post-treatment). It is also well established that parents whose first child is a girl are more likely to practice sex selection at higher parity births (for example , Pörtner 2015; Rosenblum 2013; Anukriti, Bhalotra, and Tam 2016) since they desire at least one son. Therefore, we control for the sex of the first child in Specification 3. Although we explicitly show that the fertility limits did not change the sex ratio of first births, to ensure that our results are not biased by sex selection at first parity, we restrict the sample to couples whose first child was born before the limits were announced in their state.
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The two-child limits may also improve child health. If the laws lead to fertility decline, children in smaller families are likely to receive higher per capita resources. Moreover, parents who decrease fertility to maintain office eligibility are more likely to plan fertility timing better and to invest more in these children to ensure their survival, relative to when there was no fertility constraint. In other words, the limits induce parents to improve the quality of children. We test if this is the case by estimating the impact of the fertility limits on the probability of neonatal, infant, or under-five mortality (Mor jbsta ) of child j of parity b born in state s and in year t to mother of age a using the following specification:
Neonatal mortality implies death during the first month of birth; infant mortality means death during the first year of birth; and under-five mortality is defined as death before age five. The variable Male j indicates that child j is male. For mortality regressions, we drop children that are less than one month, or one year, or five years old to allow each child in the sample "full exposure" to the risk of, respectively, neonatal, infant, and under-five mortality. In addition to the socioeconomic variables described previously, we include fixed effects for state, year of birth, parity, state · mother's age, and state-specific linear time trends in this specification. The coefficient b 2 estimates the causal effect of the limits on the mortality for girls, and b 1 estimates the differential effect on the mortality for boys.
The inclusion of state and year fixed effects controls for all time-invariant state-level variables and state-invariant time effects that might affect the outcomes of interest. The state-specific time trends account for differential linear trends in fertility and sexselection patterns across states over time (for example, due to differential growth rates of state GDP or availability of abortion and other health services). The inclusion of state mother's age fixed effects controls for any confounding differences in the age composition of mothers across states. Since treatment varies at the state level, we cluster standard errors by state. As the total number of states in our sample is 18, we also report standard errors based on a clustered (by state) wild bootstrap-t procedure described in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) to address econometric issues pertaining to a small number of clusters.
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The underlying identifying assumption in our analysis is that the state-year variation in the timing of law announcement is uncorrelated with other time-varying determinants of the outcomes of interest. Although we control for state-specific linear trends in our regressions, we also explicitly test whether the timing of announcement is correlated with other socioeconomic characteristics that vary by state and time. In Table 3 we present the coefficients from regressions that use maternal, paternal, and household characteristics as dependent variables in the estimation of Equation 2 with state and year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends, but without any other controls for the rural sample. None of the 21 coefficients in Table 3 are significant, thus eliminating any concerns about endogenous timing of announcements. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, during the sample time, there were no other state-specific programs in the treatment states that promoted smaller families and whose timing coincided with the fertility limits.
V. Results

A. Effects on Marginal Fertility
We start by examining the evolution of the hazard of birth (for birth orders one to five) in treatment states using Specification 1. The estimated a k coefficients for the annual hazard of birth over a 20-year period (16-year period for the hazards of fourth and fifth birth) are presented in Figures 2 and 3 and in Appendix Table A. 3. The year before announcement is the omitted year, and standard errors are clustered by state. Figure 2 shows clear declines in the hazards of third, fourth, and fifth birth during the post-treatment period. The magnitude of the decline is the largest for the probability of a third birth. The smaller effects on the hazards of fourth and fifth births, relative to that of the third birth, are reasonable as couples that have three or four children have most likely achieved their desired fertility, so they are less likely to have a fourth or fifth birth even in the absence of the fertility limits. The decline in the hazards of third and higher order births suggests that the two-child limits induced couples to sacrifice additional births to maintain electoral eligibility. Although this does not necessarily imply a decrease in completed fertility, the fact that the hazards of birth continue to decrease for six to nine years after the announcements indicates that our results are less likely to be driven by a mere postponement of these births.
Although the fertility limits do not impose any constraints on first or second births, and desired fertility is above one in India, we may still expect to see a decline in the hazards of the first two births after the announcements for two reasons. First, couples that reduce fertility to maintain electoral eligibility may deliberately increase birth spacing to ensure healthier births. Second, any potential sex selection for second births induced by the fertility limits may translate into lower hazard of second birth in the event study graphs. These shifts in timing should lead to a U-shaped pattern for the event study graph in the post-treatment period, that is, a decrease in the hazard of birth in the years immediately following the announcement and an eventual increase. On the other hand, some couples may rush to have their first two children if they fear or anticipate even stricter limits on fertility in the near future. The estimates in Figure 3 capture these combined effects. The hazard of first birth does appear to have a slight U-shape in the post-treatment period. Similarly, for the second birth, there seems to be a decline, although several years after the announcement. Notes: This graph plots the estimates of a k coefficients and their 95 percent confidence intervals (dashed lines) from estimating Specification 1. Due to sample size issues, for hazards of fourth and fifth birth, the sample time period is restricted to nine years before and six years after treatment. The outcome variables are indicators for births of various orders. For the regression where birth of order b is the dependent variable, the sample is restricted to years after birth (b -1) and up to and including the year of birth b. The sample is restricted to only the treatment states. The vertical line denotes the year of announcement, and the year before announcement is the omitted year. Standard errors are clustered by state.
Next we present the net impacts of the limits on marginal fertility estimated using Specification 2 where we constrain the year of last birth to be in the pre-treatment period. Table 4 presents results for the hazard of third birth, while the estimates for first, second, and fourth births are in Appendix Table A.5. The hazard of third birth is presumably the most relevant margin at which we expect the two-child limits to operate on completed fertility-at births below birth order three the policy does not bind, and at birth orders beyond three, several households may have already satisfied their desired
Figure 3 Hazards of First and Second Birth in Treatment States
fertility by the time the policy is announced. The standard errors in brackets are clustered by state and in parentheses are wild-cluster-bootstrapped by state. In Column 1, where we control for fixed effects for state, year, and years since second birth, as well as for the vector of socioeconomic characteristics, we find that the limits decreased the hazard of third birth for couples that had two children when the limits were announced in their state, but insignificantly. The effect remains negative and becomes significant in Column 2 once we control for state-specific linear time trends. We find that the probability of third birth declines by 1.97 percentage points in Column 2. This effect is large, translating into a 9 percent decline from the baseline hazard of 22.21 percent of having a third birth in a given year before announcement. The inclusion of state · mother's age fixed effects in Column 3 changes the estimated decline in third births marginally to 1.91 percentage points. Note that these estimates are net of any grace-period-driven increase in the hazard of third birth. Appendix Table A .5 shows no significant net effects on the hazard of first and second births for couples that were childless or had one child at announcement, respectively.
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In Table 5 , we present results from estimating Specification 2 inclusive of statespecific linear time trends and state · mother's age fixed effects, separately by socioeconomic group. Columns 1-4 show that among caste groups, the greatest statistically significant decline in the hazard of third birth (of 3.65 percentage points) is in SC The sample is restricted to years after the second birth and up to and including third birth for mothers whose second child was born before the year of announcement. We also restrict years since second birth to 10. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by state and in parentheses are wild-cluster-bootstrapped by state. The baseline mean is calculated for observations where Treat st = 0. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
25. We reestimated Column 3 of Table 4 without imposing any restrictions on when the first two births occurred; see Column 1 of Appendix 
(8) families, which represents a 14 percent decline from the baseline pre-announcement hazard of third birth for these households. As described in Section II, SC households are legally recognized as socially and economically disadvantaged by central and state governments, and village council positions are reserved for candidates from these castes in every state to ensure adequate political representation. As such, it is unsurprising that these households show the greatest response to the law at the margin, as they have the most to lose from reduced access to political power if they violate the fertility limits. In comparison, there is no significant decline in third births among the "general" or upper castes (and for ST families) and the coefficients are smaller than they are for SCs. In a similar vein, Columns 5-6 reveal a statistically significant decline in third births among poorer households (low SLI) of 2.37 percentage points (9 percent), whereas wealthier households with a high SLI score show no visible decline in the probability of having a third birth in Column 6. In the last four columns, we split the sample by husband's and wife's years of schooling (no schooling versus some schooling). While the coefficients in Columns 7-10 are always negative, they are significant only if the husband has no schooling. In line with the pattern of results in the rest of the table, the decline is larger for uneducated husbands than for those who are educated.
The smaller decreases in the hazard of third birth for relatively higher socioeconomic status families also reflect that these families have a lower baseline probability of third birth even in the absence of the limits and hence are, all else equal, "less treatable" than lower socioeconomic status households. For instance, the baseline hazard of third birth is only 12 percent for high SLI mothers, as compared to 25 percent for low SLI mothers.
B. Effects on The Total Number of Children
The results in the previous two tables examine the marginal effect of the limits on an additional birth conditional on a woman already having a certain number of children at announcement. However, they do not tell us the extent of substitution from, say, having four children to having only two children. In order to evaluate the overall impact of the laws on total "stock" of fertility, we reestimate Specification 2 using indicators for whether a woman reports having one, two, three, four, and five living children in a given year as the outcome variables. Unlike Specification 2, in these regressions we do not impose any restrictions on when prior children were born, and use all available years for each woman. If the two-child limits are effective, we expect the likelihood of having two children to increase and the likelihood of having more than two children to decrease after the laws have been announced in treatment states relative to control states and relative to pre-treatment years. These regressions capture the marginal effects on couples who had begun childbearing before the laws were announced, as well as the behavioral response of new parents who started having children in the post-announcement years. Table 6 presents the estimated effects of the fertility limits on these outcomes. In Panel A, we also show results from Specification 2 estimated only for the sample of treatment states. The coefficients of Treat st in Panel A imply that after the limits were announced, the probability of having two living children in a given year increased significantly by 0.75 percentage points, or 3.41 percent, in treatment states. The rest of the columns in Panel A indicate that this increase in the likelihood of two children is a result of substitution away from higher fertility levels-the probability of having three, four, or five living children declined by 0.42 percentage points (2.48 percent), 0.47 percentage points (5.62 percent), and 0.28 percentage points (8.70 percent), respectively. There is no significant impact on the likelihood of one child. Panel B in Table 6 shows a similar pattern of results, although the coefficients are not always as significant as those in Panel A unless we exclude state · mother's age fixed effects (see Table A .6).
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Figure 4 displays the probability that a couple has more than two living children in a given year over a 16-year period that includes nine pre-treatment and six post-treatment years. This graph presents estimates from Specification 1 for the treatment state sample. Consistent with the findings in Table 6 , the fertility limits led to a sharp and sustained decline in the likelihood that a couple has more than two children. 26. Since our data set is a retrospective unbalanced panel, one concern is that the women in post-announcement years may be systematically younger than those in the pre-announcement period. Although our specifications control for age fixed effects as well as for state · mother's age fixed effects, in order to test the robustness of our findings we reestimate the prior set of regressions for women who were no older than age 33 in a given year. This age restriction reduces sample selection due to changes in mother cohort composition across NFHS rounds. As Appendix Figure A .1 shows, the average age of mothers evolves smoothly over time across birth parities with the age restriction. The estimated effects on the number of children remain similar to those in Table 6 despite the age restriction. These results are available upon request.
Next, we examine heterogeneity in the effects on the total number of children by socioeconomic characteristics of the parents using Specification 2. To avoid issues related to a large number of subgroup estimates for five different outcomes, for these heterogeneity results we use an indicator for more than two living children as the outcome variable. Panel A in Table 7 focuses only on treatment states, whereas Panel B shows the estimates for all states. 27 In Panel A, the probability of having more than two children declines significantly by 1.33 percentage points or 4.42 percent in treatment states, but the coefficient is insignificant in Panel B. Although both high and low SLI families exhibit a significant decline, the magnitude of the effect is larger for low SLI households (1.9 percentage points versus 1 percentage point for high SLI). Similarly, couples where the wife has no schooling display a slightly larger decline (1.6 percentage points) than couples where the wife has some schooling (1.1 percentage points), although both are significant. In terms of husband's schooling, the coefficients are quite similar for both groups, but only significant if the husband has some schooling. In terms of caste affiliation, the only significant coefficient is for STs. On the whole, Table 7 is roughly consistent with the differential effects on hazard rates across socioeconomic groups that we described in the previous subsection, but we lose significance at conventional levels in Panel B of Table 7 .
Figure 4 Probability of Having More Than Two Living Children in Treatment States
Notes: This graph plots the estimates of a k coefficients and their 95 percent confidence intervals (dashed lines) from estimating Specification 1 where k lies in the interval [-8, 7] . The outcome variable is an indicator for having more than two living children in year t. The sample is restricted to only the treatment states. The vertical line denotes the year of announcement and the year before announcement is the omitted year. Standard errors are clustered by state.
27. The estimates for the effects on probability of less than three living children are by construction exactly the same as those in Table 7 but of the opposite sign. 
C. Effects on Contraceptive Use
To the extent that modern methods of contraception are accessible, we expect contraceptive prevalence to increase after the limits were announced. Unfortunately, we do not have individual-level or couple-level panel data for all modern methods of contraception, except for sterilization. Therefore, we estimate the effect on the use of modern contraceptive methods 28 using Specification 2, but modify it so that the time subscript refers to the year of interview. Thus, the key coefficient now estimates the difference in contraceptive use for women interviewed before and after the fertility limits were enacted, after conditioning on the year of interview, on years since last birth (or marriage, if the mother has only one child), on the mother's age at the time of interview, and on the previous set of covariates. Unlike prior regressions, here we use repeated crosssections of data.
Appendix Table A .8 presents the estimates. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if a woman reports using any modern method of contraception at the time of her interview, and zero otherwise. In Columns 1-3, the sample is restricted to years after the year of second birth for women whose second birth took place before the limit was announced in her state. All three columns show a significant increase in contraceptive use due to the limits; Column 3 implies a 3.8 percentage point or an 8.03 percent increase from a baseline prevalence of 47.3 percent.
In Columns 4-6, we examine the subsample of women who had one, two, and three living children in the year of interview and do not impose any restrictions on when these births took place. If the fertility limits reduced childbearing after two children, we should observe a larger increase in the contraceptive use of women with two children as compared to the rest. The results are consistent with this hypothesis. While there is an increase of four percentage points in contraceptive use for women who had two children, the coefficient for women who had three children is 0.018 and insignificant, and for women who had one child the coefficient is -0.014 and insignificant. For families with two children, the coefficient translates into a 9.8 percent increase in the use of modern contraceptive methods.
We also estimate the effect of the limits on wife's or husband's sterilization in a hazard framework using the woman-year panel and Specification 2. 29 For each woman, we drop the years after the year of sterilization from our sample and estimate the impact on the hazard of sterilization in a given year. We find significant increases in sterilization rates for couples where either the husband or the wife have zero years of schooling; these couples also have the highest baseline usage of sterilization.
D. Effects on the Sex Ratio at Birth
Next we examine the effects of the fertility limits on the sex ratio of second and higher parity births for all households and by household caste using Specification 3. Caste is a unique phenomenon of Indian society. As opposed to other dimensions of socioeconomic status, caste is exogenous in the sense that an individual is born into a caste and 28. Modern methods of contraception comprise male or female sterilization, pills, condoms, intrauterine devices, diaphragms, and injections. 29. These results are available upon request. cannot choose it. The caste hierarchy is quite rigid and has been preserved by the low prevalence of intercaste marriages despite substantial economic development. 30 In order to maintain their superior social position, higher caste households have historically laid greater emphasis on ritual purity and adherence of religious texts, and this has often been at the expense of women's position within these households (Das Gupta et al. 2003; Das Gupta 2010) . The essential role played by a son in Hindu rituals is also considered to be an important factor underlying the strong preference for sons among upper caste Hindus. 31 For these reasons, we focus on heterogeneity in the sex ratio effects by caste. Specifically, we divide our sample into four caste groups: SCs, STs, OBCs, and upper castes. Although OBC families have a lower caste status, they are above SCs in the caste hierarchy, as well as in their socioeconomic status. The castes that are included in the OBC category vary across states; for instance, the Jat caste group is included in the OBC category in Rajasthan, but not in Haryana. Although OBC status is meant to improve the socioeconomic situation of historically backward classes, quite often politically dominant castes are able to lobby for OBC status in order to benefit from caste-based quotas in public employment and education. This often leads to socioeconomically privileged castes having OBC status in particular states, such as the influential landowning Reddy and Kamma castes in Andhra Pradesh (Deshpande and Ramachandran 2014) . 32 Moreover, the process of Sanskritization (Srinivas 1962) suggests that the relatively well-off lower castes tend to emulate the rituals and practices of the upper castes, seeking upward mobility within the caste hierarchy. Thus, it is likely that the sex-selective behavior of OBCs is more similar to that of upper castes as opposed to SCs and STs.
For the sex ratio analysis, we restrict the sample to women whose first child was born before the announcement of the limits and control for the gender of this child as the firstborn child's gender is known to be exogenous and is a strong predictor of future fertility and sex-selective behavior. 33 These results are displayed in Table 8 . Columns 1-5 correspond respectively to the entire sample and to subsamples of SCs, STs, OBCs, and upper castes. Panel A focuses on the sample of treatment states and shows that the limits have no significant impact on the sex ratio of second and higher parity birth in the total sample or for SCs, STs, and surprisingly also for the upper caste sample. However, in Column 4 there is a large and highly significant 5.28 percentage point, or 10.32 percent, increase in the sex ratio for the OBC sample over a baseline probability of 51.17 percent. We find the same pattern of results in Panel B with OBC households exhibiting a significant 5.57 percentage point (10.74 percent) increase in the probability that a birth is male.
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While the upper castes are believed to have the strongest son preference in India, they also have the lowest fertility. In fact, in prior tables, we did not find large or significant 30. According to the 2005 India Human Development Survey, only 4.4 percent of women were married to a spouse from a different caste. 31. Although caste is primarily a Hindu phenomenon, the notion of caste-based hierarchy remains well preserved among many other religious groups in India. 32. In recent years, the Jat community in Haryana and the Patels in Gujarat have been proactively seeking OBC status. 33. In Appendix Table A.7, we verify that the fertility limits did not affect the sex ratio of first births. 34. Columns 2-6 in Appendix Table A .4 show that our sex ratio findings remain the same even without any restriction on the year of first birth. These results correspond to Panel B of Table 8 that includes both treatment and control states; the findings for the sample of only treatment states also remain unchanged. fertility decline for upper castes, likely because they have low baseline fertility to begin with. Thus, it is possible that the lack of significant sex ratio effects for upper castes also reflects that they are "less treatable" than other caste groups due to high prevalence of sex selection at baseline. For the reasons mentioned above, it is not too surprising that OBC households respond to the law with greater sex selection, as sex-selective behavior has been shown to be concentrated in non-SC and non-ST households with higher socioeconomic status (for example, see Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010; Anukriti et al. 2016) . Further, OBCs constitute significant fractions of the populations in our treatment states, such as Haryana (28.1 percent), Rajasthan (47.5 percent), Madhya Pradesh (41.2 percent), and Maharashtra (27.1 percent), 35 that have highly adverse sex ratios of 861, 922, 920, and 922 females per 1,000 males, respectively, in the 2001 Census of India. Table 9 reports the results on neonatal, infant, and under-five mortality from Specification 4.
E. Effects on Child Health
36 For neonatal mortality, there is a decline for both boys and girls, although an 35. This information is from the 64th round of the National Sample Survey of India (2007) (2008) . 36. The results for the treatment state sample are similar and are available upon request.
insignificant one. Examining the impacts separately by birth order shows that the limits decreased neonatal mortality among first births (albeit insignificantly), consistent with the slight delay in the timing of first births. 37 Neonatal mortality for male second births declined significantly, but not for females. As neonatal survival is closely linked to prenatal and delivery conditions, these improvements suggest that parents also altered the fetal and at-birth environment, either because of greater per capita availability of resources or deliberately to improve child quality. The gender differences likely arise from the fact that male children are more fragile in early life. Thus, the improvements in prenatal care and delivery environment due to the limits benefitted male children more than female children.
On the other hand, the improvements in infant and under-five mortality are larger for girls (10.34 percent and 20.62 percent, respectively) than for boys, who also experienced mortality declines. 38 As infant and child mortality rates for boys are smaller than for girls at baseline, and substantially so for higher order births and for those preceded by a first girl (Anukriti, Bhalotra, and Tam 2016) , this heterogeneity by gender is not surprising as girls have "more room" for improvement in survival.
These coefficients are likely to underestimate the true gains in survival since children born pre-announcement (the comparison group in Specification 4) may also benefit from lower completed fertility of their parents. Notes: This table reports the coefficients from Specification 4. The outcomes variables are indicators for death during the first month, during the first year, and during the first five years of birth in Columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The baseline mean is calculated for observations where Treat st = 0. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by state and in parentheses are wild-cluster-bootstrapped by state. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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. Mortality results by birth order are available upon request. 38. On the basis of the wild-cluster-bootstrapped errors, there is no significant difference in the under-five mortality decline for boys and girls.
VI. Robustness
In this section we conduct several checks to ensure that we are capturing the causal impact of the fertility limits. First, in Appendix Table A.9, we reestimate the effect on the hazard of third birth (using Specification 2) by dropping one treatment state at a time. Our findings remain the same; this shows that our estimates are not driven by any particular treatment state.
Next we conduct a placebo test by reassigning the treatment to a year before the actual law was announced in a treatment state and by reestimating the effect on the hazard of third birth using Specification 2. We maintain the same gap between announcements across treatment states as in reality, so a placebo treatment year (t 0 ) in the first state determines the placebo announcement year for the remaining treatment states as (t 0 + k), where k is the number of years between the two actual announcements. Hence, the latest placebo "first law" that we can examine is 1983 (that is, the first state enacts in 1983, and the last state enacts in 1993), as we drop the years after actual announcement in treatment states. If our results are capturing the causal effect of the limits, we should not find significant effects in these placebo regressions. In Appendix Table A.10, each column uses a different year as a placebo treatment year for the first law. The coefficients are always insignificant.
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Our results so far set Treat st = 0 for the control states for the entire sample period. Moreover, in Specification 2, for the hazard of birth b regressions, we restricted the sample to observations where the (b -1) birth took place before the announcement. Since no limits exist in the control states, there is no restriction on the year of (b -1) birth for them. This differential restriction may bias our findings if women in the treated states had their last birth much earlier than women in the control states. Although we include fixed effects for years since last birth in our hazard regressions, we nevertheless conduct two further tests to check the robustness of our findings by assigning fictitious treatment years to our control group. We estimate the following equation:
For a treatment state, Post st indicates years during which the law is in place; the year before the year of announcement is the omitted year. For a control state, Post st indicates years during which a fictitious law is in place; we assign the same announcement year to a control state as its neighboring treatment state. If a control state borders multiple treatment states, we randomly assign it the treatment year of one of its neighbors. The b coefficients estimate the "effect" of fictitious laws on control states, and a measures the actual policy effect on the treatment states after differencing out the "effect" on the control group. Appendix Table A .11 shows the effects on the hazard of third birth, on various child compositions, and on the sex ratio from Specification 5. Reassuringly, none of the b coefficients are significant. Moreover, estimates of the a coefficient are in line with our previous findings.
39. We conducted an alternative test by assigning the same placebo treatment year to all treatment states, thus ignoring the spacing in announcement across states. Out of 18 placebo treatment years (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) , we find a significant negative "effect" in only two cases, further supporting our findings.
One may still worry that assigning fictitious treatment years to a control state based on its bordering treatment states is not a strict enough test. Therefore, we also perform a check where we assign the same treatment year to each control state, irrespective of which treatment state it borders, and repeat this exercise using each year during 1993-1999. Appendix Table A .12 shows that the results are remarkably similar in magnitude Figure 5 Effect on Fertility Using the Synthetic Control Method Notes: The dashed line is the synthetic control state, and the solid line is for the treatment states. The outcome variable in the top figure is an indicator for two living children in a given year and in the bottom graph indicates third birth in a given year. In the bottom graph, the sample is restricted to years after the second birth and up to and including the third birth. The synthetic control is constructed using the "synth" command in STATA based on the method proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) . The corresponding weights assigned to each control state in the donor pool are available in Appendix Table A.13. The vertical line indicates the year of announcement.
to those in Table 4 . The estimated coefficient a is significant in all but one column, and b is never significant.
Lastly, we use the synthetic control method proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) as an alternative estimation approach. 40 This method allows us to construct a synthetic control state that best approximates the treatment states during the pre-treatment period. To avoid the computational complexities associated with multiple treatment states with different treatment years, we combine all treatment states into one group and redefine the time variable as years from announcement. We again assign placebo treatment years to neighboring control states to define this time variable for them. We collapse the data to state-year level, and using a vector of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, construct a synthetic control state to approximate the outcomes that would have been observed for the treatment state(s) in the absence of the fertility limits. The donor pool comprises all never-treated states. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the probability of having two living children and the likelihood of a third birth in a given year before and after the limits. In both cases, the synthetic control state resembles the treatment states closely before the limits were announced. 41 However, for nearly the whole period after the announcement, couples in treatment states are much more likely to report having two living children and less likely to have a third birth compared to the synthetic control state. However, these results should be interpreted with caution as a lot of states receive zero weight in the construction of the synthetic control.
VII. Discussion
Given that average baseline terminal fertility in the treatment states is 2.8, the two-child limits impose a binding constraint on childbearing for a large fraction of individuals in these states. In our sample, nearly 30 percent of couples in treatment states where the wife is 15-49 years old had more than two children at baseline. We find that the probability of having more than two children declines significantly by 1.33 percentage points in treatment states-that is, 1.33 percent of couples where the wife is 15-49 years old decreased their fertility due to the limits. According to the 2001 Census of India, the number of married rural women in the 15-49 age group in treatment states is 46,269,920. 42 Thus, 615,390 (which is 1.33 percent of 46,269,920) couples responded to the limits. If we treat husbands and wives as separate individuals, the number doubles-that is, 1,230,780 individuals responded to the limits.
We can do the same calculation using our estimated effects on the hazard of third birth. We find that the probability of having a third child declines by 1.91 percentage points in treatment states-that is, 1.91 percent of couples where the wife is 15-49 years old and who had two children in treatment states decreased their marginal fertility due to 40. We use the synth command in STATA. 41. The exact weights assigned to each donor state in the construction of the synthetic control state are available in Appendix Table A .13. 42 . We use the number of married women in the 15-49 age group in treatment states ( = 71,184,492) and multiply it by the share of rural women in our sample ( = 0.65) to get the corresponding number for the rural sector, that is, 46,269,920. the limits. According to the 2001 Census of India, the number of married rural women in the 15-49 age group in treatment states who had two children is 10,562,944.
43 Thus, 208,090 (which is 1.97 percent of 10,562,944) couples responded to the limits. Again, if we treat husbands and wives as separate individuals, the numbers double-that is, 416,180 individuals gave up a third child as a result of the limits. The total number of couples who adjusted fertility (in the previous paragraph) is higher since it also includes couples who started childbearing after the limits were announced and those who had one child at announcement and stopped after having the second child. Notably, we also find that the decline in fertility due to the limits reduced early-life child mortality by a significant margin.
Although we cannot credibly distinguish between the relative importance of the aspirations, role model, and anticipation channels, our estimated impacts are large and consistent with the high participation of voters and candidates in local politics, making both the aspirations and the role-model channel plausible. If we assume that the fertility response is entirely driven by political aspirations, we can also translate the numbers in the previous paragraphs into response per council seat. Our treatment states had 912,597 seats across all three tiers of the Panchayat system in 2004. The 1,230,780 figure thus translates into a response rate of 1.35 individuals per seat. The Association for Democratic Reforms reports an average of 2.43 candidates per village council seat. This implies that slightly more than half of all potential contestants per seat in each election cycle in treatment states altered their fertility. In reality, not all incumbents would get disqualified by these limits. According to survey data from South India (Besley et al. 2004) , about 35 percent of village council heads or members had more than two children in 2002. Assuming the same fertility distribution for enacting states and assuming that all incumbents who have two or fewer children would be able to get reelected, 1,230,780 individuals adjusted fertility for 593,188 seats that became "vacant" due to disqualification of the incumbents, which is 2.07 people per seat, or 85 percent of contestants per seat. Even if we assume that only one of the spouses runs for office, 28-43 percent of contestants per seat adjusted fertility due to these laws if aspirations are the only mechanism behind the results.
How do our estimates compare with other fertility reduction programs in developing countries? Although fertility decline appears to be primarily driven by decreases in desired fertility (Pritchett 1994) , access to family planning also seems to matter (Canning and Schultz 2012) . For example, the family planning interventions in Matlab (Bangladesh) decreased the number of living children by 17-23 percent in treatment areas. Similarly, in Navrongo (Ghana) health interventions that improved access to and information about contraception, led to a 9 percent decrease in the number of children ever born. Other large-scale population control programs have also been shown to impact fertility rates-for example, Almond, Li, and Zhang (2013) find that China's One Child Policy that imposes fines on couples who violate the one-child limit decreased fertility by 2 percent. In the context of India, Anukriti (2018) shows that a financial incentive program that targets both fertility and sex ratios reduced the 43. We use the number of married women in the 15-49 age group with two children in treatment states (=16,250,683) and multiply it by the share of rural women in our sample ( = 0.65) to get the corresponding number for the rural sector, that is, 10,562,944. number of children by 1 percent. While our setting is not directly comparable to these other studies, the fertility limits decreased the likelihood of third birth among couples who had two children at announcement by 9 percent and reduced the overall probability of having more than two living children by 3.41 percent. Thus, our estimated effects are somewhat larger than those achieved by direct financial incentive and disincentive programs, but smaller than the effects of interventions like Matlab that increase contraceptive access.
VIII. Conclusion
We find that the two-child limits on candidates in village council elections decrease fertility and improve children's health among constituents, but also lead to an unintended increase in the already male-biased sex ratio in certain socioeconomic groups. These effects may be caused by constituents' political ambitions, through the role-model influence of their leaders, or by anticipation of stricter restrictions in other nonpolitical arenas. Political aspirations may not only reflect the desire to effect positive social change, but could also be driven by rent-seeking behavior. The potential income from political rents and corrupt practices may be a strong incentive for becoming an officeholder in low-income countries. While we cannot separately identify these "altruistic" and "selfish" components of political aspirations, we show that these ambitions may be substantial and represent a previously ignored channel of demographic change.
Our findings are timely and policy-relevant, as recently some Indian states have enacted similar restrictions to meet policy goals in the areas of education and sanitation. As of 2014, individuals are barred from village council membership in Rajasthan if they have less than primary schooling or if they do not have a functional toilet in their home. Another north Indian state, Haryana, has also imposed education and sanitation requirements in the 2016 village council elections. A key difference between fertility limits and education requirements is that while prospective candidates of childbearing ages can choose to not have children in response to the fertility limits, they are likely to be too old to increase years of schooling to prevent disbarment. In this sense, the effect of fertility limits on birth rate is more likely to be immediate, whereas the education requirements are more likely to affect schooling of the younger cohorts who will become candidates after several years. Moreover, there is a lot more state-year variation in fertility policies relative to other candidate requirements, making the current setup a useful one to examine. Further, we show that population control measures that ignore son preference can worsen the sex ratio at birth. Similar limits have been proposed for members of state legislative assemblies and the national parliament in India. If incentives for local leadership are stronger than state or national leadership ambitions, or if the role-model potential of local leaders is higher, the proposed limits may be less effective than the laws we examine.
Fertility restrictions on elected leaders also have implications for political representation of various groups. The limits impose a more severe constraint on couples with weaker access to contraception or higher demand for children, increasing their risk of disqualification and reducing their political representation. The limits could also impede the progress made by caste-based affirmative action if only the relatively well off among the lower castes are able to meet the eligibility criteria. Gender-based quotas could also be undermined, as aspiring female leaders may not have autonomy over their fertility due to intrahousehold gender disparities. Indeed, women are the overwhelming majority of individuals in Appendix Table A.2 that were disqualified for violating the limits. Our hazard results suggest that the fertility decline is significant even for low socioeconomic status families, diminishing some of these concerns, but the possibility remains for the most disadvantaged households within each group we examine. An explicit examination of the impact of these limits on political outcomes is crucial but is beyond the scope of this paper. Notes: This table reports the coefficients from Specification 2, except that now the time subscript refers to the year of interview. The coefficients estimate the difference in contraceptive use for women interviewed before and after the fertility limits were enacted in their respective states. Unlike prior regressions, these specifications use repeated cross-sections of data. Modern methods of contraception comprise male or female sterilization, pills, condoms, intrauterine devices, diaphragms, and injections. In Columns 1-3, the sample is restricted to years after the year of second birth for women whose second birth took place before the limit was announced in her state. In Columns 4-6, the sample is restricted to women who had two, three, and one living child, respectively, in the year of interview. In Column 6, FE for years since last birth are replaced with FE for years since marriage. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by state and in parentheses are wild-cluster-bootstrapped by state. The baseline mean is calculated for observations where Treat st = 0. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 197,322 193,760 187,645 194,904 193,506 193,483 191,396 Notes: This table reports the coefficients from the strictest version of Specification 2. The outcome variable is an indicator for third birth. Each column drops one treatment state at a time. The sample is restricted to years after the second birth and up to and including third birth for mothers whose second child was born before the year of announcement. We also restrict years since second birth to ten. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by state. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Notes: This table reports the coefficients from the strictest version of Specification 2. The outcome variable is an indicator for third birth. Each coefficient is from a separate regression with a different placebo treatment year for the first state to enact the limits. For the remaining treatment states, the placebo treatment year is automatically determined as we maintain the same gap between law enactment years across states as in reality. The sample is restricted to years before the actual treatment took place. The sample is restricted to years after the second birth and up to and including third birth for mothers whose second child was born before the year of announcement. We also restrict years since second birth to ten. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by state. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Notes: This table reports the coefficients from Specification 5. The outcome variable is an indicator for third birth in Column 1, indicators for specific number of living children in Columns 2-5, and an indicator for a birth being male in Columns 6-9. In Column 1, the sample is restricted to years after the second birth and up to and including third birth for mothers whose second child was born before the year of announcement; we also restrict years since second birth to 10. In Columns 6-9, the sample is restricted to second and higher order births to women whose first child was born before the law was announced in her state. SC, ST, OBC, and Upper indicate Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Other Backward Class, and upper caste households, respectively. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by state. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Third Birth = 1
Appendix
(1) Notes: This table reports the coefficients from Specification 5. All never-treated or control states are assigned the same "fake" or placebo treatment year that varies across columns. The outcome variable is an indicator for third birth. The sample is restricted to years after the second birth and up to and including third birth for mothers whose second child was born before the year of announcement. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by state. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Notes: This graph plots the trends in average age of mothers who have a given number of children in a year. The sample is restricted to mothers age 33 in a given year.
